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The federal government’s new industrial relations legislation (WorkChoice) is designed 
to radically change the way agreement-making is conducted in Australia. The proposed 
changes will see primacy of individual and common-law contracts over collective 
bargaining; significant marginalisation of third parties (unions and industrial tribunals) in 
the wage setting process; the emasculation of awards; and a reduction in the allowable 
matters for bargaining purposes. Proponents of the changes seek to strengthen 
managerial prerogative as a way of supporting economic growth (and, by assumption, 
employment growth). Opponents of the reforms are, in contrast, concerned about the 
overall effects on community standards such as minimum wages, reasonable hours of 
work, penalty rates and annual leave. Although the legislation formally provides for 
some accepted community standards, actual interpretation of how the standards are to 
be applied in practice will vary.  For example, submissions to the Senate Employment, 
Workplace Relation and Education Legislative Committee expressed concern over the 
interpretation of clauses relating to standard hours of work, equal pay, leave provisions, 
penalty rates of pay, and other minimum standards. 
 
In this paper we examine the earnings for select occupational groups since 1986 to 
reflect on the likely effects of a nationally deregulated industrial system on wages and 
employment outcomes for the lowly paid. We also draw on the Western Australian 
experience of industrial relations deregulation to reflect on how the removal of the 
protection of awards is likely to affect lowly paid workers. We begin with a brief 
overview of the Australian industrial relations system highlighting the historical role of 
tribunals in setting wages and community standards, as well as the more recent move to 
a decentralized, workplace-oriented approach to industrial relations. We then examine 
the 1993 federal and WA enterprise bargaining legislation noting the differences 
afforded to protecting low paid workers in the two Acts. Next we analyse the wage 
relativities of a select number of occupational groups as a way of understanding how pay 
decentralization has impacted on particular groups of workers. The analysis suggests 
that decentralism has been accompanied by greater wage dispersion. This is followed by 
an analysis of wage rates between groups in WA where deregulation and decentralized 
pay bargaining has not involved the same safeguards as with other systems. This analysis 
suggests an even greater dispersion of wage rates. The final section is by way of 
summary and conclusion.  
 
From Uniformity to Flexibility 
Australia has had a distinctive set of arrangements for the determination of industrial 
relations outcomes and community employment standards. Until recently, the federal 
government used the limiting industrial (or arbitration) powers to establish industrial 
tribunals to determine pay and other conditions of employment as part of their role in 
preventing and settling industrial disputes. Within this system primacy was given to 
collective bargaining whilst public interest tests (such as the economic and employment 
effects of particular decisions) guided wage fixing principles and outcomes. Over time, 
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the actions of tribunals led to industry and national award rates of pay. The focus was 
on ensuring an acceptable set of wage relativities within and between occupations and 
industries as a way of minimising industrial disputes. The principle of comparative wage 
justice that guided this approach ensured that those in weak bargaining positions were 
able to maintain their relative award wage rates. 
 
The new legislation signals a marked change from the past. Using the corporations 
powers, the government has sought a more interventionist role, and one that displaces 
the role of the State industrial relations systems. In this new approach individual 
agreements will have primacy over collective bargaining, and the rights to collectively 
bargain will be significantly curtailed. Even if a majority of employees wish to bargain 
collectively (with or without a union) the employer need not agree and may instead 
offer individual agreements.  The equity norms and safety standards of the previous 
system are at risk under the new regime. Thus, through ‘agreement’ the parties to 
individual agreements may negotiate over accepted community standards. Parties, may, 
for example, choose to trade off some annual leave in lieu of a pay increase, average out 
their hours, and trade off penalty rates or other entitlements. Further, such agreements 
do not attempt to maintain established wage relativities. Those in a strong bargaining 
position (whether employers or employees) can exploit that position; the converse is 
true of those in a weak bargaining position. 
 
The new legislation builds on developments that have accompanied the de-protection of 
the Australian economy. Following the 25 per cent across-the-board tariff reduction 
induced by the Whitlam Government in 1973, award fragmentation became common. 
This fragmentation broke up industry (and in some cases multi-industry) awards into 
specific sector or company awards. International pressures further induced the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) to abandon its historic claim for 
comprehensive real wage maintenance in 1986. At that year’s national wage case the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) introduced the first set of devolved 
wage guidelines that, by 1991, had resulted in the Enterprise Bargaining Principles. 
These, together with legislation, reduced the role of post-1991 national wage cases to 
little more than the maintenance of a safety net of employment standards. In this climate 
of change, the Commission described its wage function principles as ‘part of the 
transition to a new system of industrial relations’.  The Commission formulated 
principles which it considered would aid ‘the evolutionary process towards a system 
which combines an equitable and rational award system and a prime focus on enterprise 
industrial relations’ (AIRC 1993:17).    
 
Enterprise Bargaining Variants – Federal and WA Regimes  
The call for greater flexibility, and the ‘transition to a new system’, led to both the State 
and national governments legislating to bring about such flexibility. Writing in 1994, 
Reitgano noted that ‘since 1990, at both the Commonwealth and state level, legislative 
activity has been directed largely towards facilitating the encouragement of collective 
bargaining models designed to achieve enterprise restructuring and microeconomic 
labour market reform’. Of importance to this paper is legislation ratified by the federal 
(Labor) and WA (Coalition) governments in 1993. Both pieces of legislation were 
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concerned with the development of greater enterprise-based bargaining. The federal 
legislation, however, provided for a range of safeguards to ensure that bargaining did not 
reduce relative standards for vulnerable workers. The WA legislation provided for 
minimum standards, but had little concern with relative standards.1  
 
In summary, the (Commonwealth) Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 aimed at 
‘encouraging and facilitating enterprise bargaining and agreements’ while ‘protecting 
wages and conditions of employment through awards’.2  The distinctive feature of this 
federal Act was the provisions relating to ‘enterprise flexibility agreements’. These were 
limited to ‘constitutional corporations’, that is, corporations coming under 
Commonwealth jurisdiction through the corporations head of power. These agreements 
could be negotiated by unions or by other employee representatives. If the Commission 
was satisfied that the majority of employees approved, it certified the agreement, thus 
giving it force in law. When certified, agreements had precedence over any award or 
other industrial instrument that would have applied. In addition to this scrutiny, the 
Commission had to apply the ‘no disadvantage test’, that is, no agreement could be any 
less favourable when conditions were evaluated overall than the relevant award.  
The 1993 Act was largely supplanted by the Coalition’s Workplace Relations Act 1996 
through which Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs) took the place of enterprise 
flexibility agreements. The new Act reduced the role of the AIRC, awards and unions. . 
Despite these changes, the lack of majority in the Senate forced the Government to 
seek compromises. In the end, the new Act preserved some balance between flexibility 
and safeguards, including the ‘no-disadvantage test’. Further, the AIRC continued to have 
an important role in determining the national safety net. 
 
WA also legislated in 1993 to provide for greater scope for enterprise bargaining. That 
system survived until 2003. We argue that this legislation, without the safeguards that 
were attached to the federal system, provides a good litmus test for what might happen 
to employment conditions for the vulnerable under WorkChoice. 
 
Prior to this legislation, the WA industrial relations system mirrored that of the other 
State and federal systems. At its apex was the Western Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (WAIRC) that had conciliation and arbitration powers. The WAIRC 
determined a minimum State wage, usually on an annual basis. The 1993 changes sought 
to reduce the role of the WAIRC and to provide for enterprise agreements outside of 
the award system. The vehicle for achieving these outcomes was the Workplace 
Agreements Act 1993. This was intended: 
 
                                                 
1  The Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 prescribed the minimum wage (Part 3) and leave 
conditions (Part 4). The minimum wage was determined by the Minister, covered a 40 hour week (rather 
than the 38 hour week specified in most awards), and was typically around $40 per week lower than the 
adult minimum wage determined by the tribunals (see appendix A to this paper). The casual loading was 
set at lower rate: 15 per cent vis-a-vis the 25 per cent loading typically found in awards.   
2 Other objects of this Act sought to ensure that Australia met international labour standards, and to 
prevent and eliminate ‘specified forms of discrimination, such as discrimination on the basis of race, 
colour, sex, sexual preference, age, physical or mental disability, marital status, family responsibilities, 
pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin’. 
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to provide for the making of agreements between employers and employees as 
to their respective rights and obligations, for the registration of such agreements 
by a public official, for the effect of such agreements, and for their 
enforcement, to confer immunity for certain industrial action relating to such 
agreements, and to provide for related matters (s.1). 
 
Under the Act, workplace agreements could be negotiated between employers and 
their employees. Both parties could be assisted by bargaining agents who could be an 
individual, a union or some other body. Once signed by the parties, the agreement could 
be registered by the Commissioner for Workplace Agreements. Limited tests applied to 
the registration of workplace agreements.3 Once registered, agreements displaced any 
awards and the jurisdiction of the WAIRC.  
 
The development of both federal and State enterprise bargaining systems provide 
valuable insights about possible developments under the new federal legislation, 
particularly since this legislation embodies many of the features of the former WA 
legislation while removing the protections of the former federal legislation. In the 
following sections we review the increased wage dispersion that has accompanied 
decentralized pay bargaining at the national level. We then turn to the WA experience 
to suggest that its lack of safeguards significantly affected the employment conditions for 
the low paid, many of whom are women. 
  
Enterprise Bargaining Outcomes – National Overview 
In this section we use data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Employee 
Earnings & Hours (EEH) survey (Catalogue Number 6306.0) to examine patterns of 
wage outcomes at the national level before and after the introduction of a more 
decentralised wages system and deregulated labour market. 4  
 
We begin by highlighting changes in the methods of pay setting in Australia. As noted in 
the preceding section, throughout most of the last century wage determination was 
highly centralised and co-ordinated with a deliberate focus on the fairness of wage 
relativities, both within and across occupational groups. In 1990, 83 per cent of all 
employees in Australia were employed under awards determined by either the federal 
tribunal (33 per cent of employees) or State tribunals (50 per cent of employees) (ABS 
1990).  Since then, the arrangements for wage determination have become increasingly 
fragmented, with differences being particularly pronounced between full-time and part-
time workers. By May 2004, only 12.6 per cent of full-time employees (and 34.3 per 
cent of part-time employees) were dependent on awards, and therefore national safety 
net wage adjustments, for annual pay increases. By contrast, 41.5 per cent of full-time 
employees (39.7 per cent of part-time employees) had their conditions of employment 
determined by collective agreements. Importantly, 46 per cent of full-time employees 
                                                 
3 The WAIRC had to be satisfied that the agreement complied with the provisions of the Act, that all 
parties understood their rights and obligations, and that each party genuinely wanted the agreement. 
4 Unless otherwise stated, the data are for non-managerial adult full-time employees as at May of each 
year specified. 
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(26 per cent of part-time employees) had their wages determined by individual 
agreements (mostly in the form of informal unwritten and/or unregistered over-award 
bargains).5  
 
The significance of the above developments is that the wage adjustments under the 
various wage fixing instruments or streams differ markedly – with adjustments awarded 
in the award stream significantly lower than those awarded in the bargaining stream 
(Preston 2001). The markedly different outcomes reflect, in part, the will of the federal 
government and its insistence that ‘… arbitrated safety net adjustments not act as a 
disincentive to agreement making’. (DEWRSB 2001: 98).  Given the fragmentation of the 
system, and a concerted effort by the government to hold down the wages by those in 
the award stream (i.e. the stream where bargaining power is weaker), one would expect 
to see a fanning out of wage relativities over the 1990s. A review of average weekly 
total earnings suggests that such dispersion did take place. Over the period 1986 to 
2004, the average weekly total earning for managers increased by 127.5 per cent while 
that of non-managers by 121.3 per cent (ABS 6306.0).   
 
In the remainder of this section we utilize average weekly total earnings (AWTE) to 
examine wage movements over the past two decades.6  Given that our interest is on 
understanding how developments have affected particular sectors of the economy, we 
focus our attention on select groups, specifically: the mining industry - a male dominated 
sector experiencing strong growth and skills shortages; the retail sector  – a sector with 
above average take up of formal individual agreements and a high level of casualisation;  
nursing – a female dominated sector which is highly unionized but participates in a 
monopsonistic labour market; hairdressing – a highly feminised low paid, low unionized, 
sector; and cleaning – a mixed gendered low paid occupation.  Figure 1 presents the 
nominal wage data for the period 1986 to 2004; Figure 2 shows the same data as a share 
of AWTE for all non-managerial employees. 
 
The data in Figure 1 suggest a widening wage gap between the highly paid and the lowly 
paid, and also the maintenance of relativities within the lowly paid band. The widening 
gap can be attributed to workplace bargaining; the maintenance of relativities to 
institutional arrangements. The wage gap between those in the mining industry and 
cleaners has increased significantly. In 1990, the nominal weekly wage gap was equal to 
$411; by 2002 it had increased to $813. Put differently, in 1990 the average weekly total 
                                                 
5 Fewer than two percent of all agreements were formal (i.e. written and formally approved) individual 
agreements.  
6  Since 1994 there has been a steady increase in average weekly ordinary time earnings (AWOTE) as a 
proportion of average weekly total earning (AWTE). At May 1994, 90.2 per cent of male AWTE were 
accounted for by AWOTE; by May 2004 this ratio had increased to 92.8 per cent (a 2.58 percentage point 
change). The movement reflects, amongst other things, the trading off of overtime pay and penalty rates in 
the shift towards an annualized pay.  For women the changes have been less dramatic, reflecting the fact 
that women are generally under-represented in over-award bargaining and in overtime work; at May 2004 
the AWOTE/AWTE ratio for women was equal to 98.1 per cent (it narrowed by 0.65 percentage points 
between 1994 and 2004).  
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earnings of a cleaner relative to someone in the mining industry was equal to 50 per 
cent; by 2002 the ratio had fallen to 42.7 per cent. 
 
Figure 1:  Average Weekly Total Earnings, by Select Occupational & Industry Groups, 


























Source: ABS 6306.0 
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Figure 2:  Average Weekly Total Earnings (AWTE), by Select Occupational & Industry 
Groups Benchmarked to AWTE of all non-managerial employees, 1986-2004 (Adult, 

























Source: ABS 6306 




The data in Figure 2 further illustrate that the outcomes of enterprise bargaining or 
decentralised pay bargaining have not been uniform. At May 1992, just after the 
introduction of enterprise bargaining in October 1991 (and the awarding of a pay 
increase), AWTE in the mining sector was 59 per cent above the AWTE of all non-
managerial employees, whilst the corresponding earnings advantage for nurses was 23 
per cent.  At the other end of the spectrum, the corresponding May 1992 relative (i.e. 
relative to the average for all non-managerial employees) pay disadvantage (or pay gap) 
for was 22 and 36 per cent for cleaners and hairdressers, respectively.  By May 2002 the 
relativity for cleaners had widened to a gap of 28 percentage points. Nurses had 
similarly lost out, with their pay advantage falling from 23 percentage points to 13 
percentage points. In the mining sector the pay advantage had further increased to 68 
per cent by May 2002.  
 
The story told by these data are consistent with stories told elsewhere of rising wage 
inequality in the Australian labour market (Saunders, 2005).  Amongst all full-time 
employees, males at the bottom of the wage distribution have experienced the greatest 
relative loss in incomes.  Between 1986 and 2000-01 the wage outcomes of women in 
the 10th percentile increased by 18 per cent, while male earnings in this bracket fell by 
three per cent. Preston (2003) observes a similar outcome over the period 1990-1998, 
noting in particular that it is male employees in the private sector who have experienced 
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relatively slower wages growth. The change coincides with falling rates of union 
membership (Peetz, 2002).    
 
Portents from the West 
The previous section suggested that the move to decentralized and enterprise-based 
wage determination has been accompanied by a greater dispersion in wage rates. Some 
have been advantaged; the lowest paid have been disadvantaged. As already noted, the 
federal enterprise bargaining system introduced in 1993 contained a number of 
safeguards for vulnerable workers. The 1996 amendments relaxed some of those 
safeguards but nevertheless maintained the safety net and the ‘no-disadvantage’ test. We 
contend that these safeguards reduced the degree of wage dispersion that would have 
resulted in their absence. This is important for the future as the federal legislation has 
removed safeguards. We test this premise by examining the WA situation between 
1993, when the Workplace Relations Act was introduced, and 2003 when this Act was 
repealed. As noted, this workplace bargaining system did not contain the safeguards that 
formed part of the federal system. We test our premise in two ways. Firstly, we 
examine the effects on the relative wages of females, and secondly we examine the wage 
outcomes for low paid workers. 
 
Gender pay ratios provide useful measures of the progress and status of women in the 
labour market. Against such indicators, it can be shown that women in WA have fared 
badly relative to males and, indeed, relative to other women in Australia. Table 1 
provides details of adult average weekly total earnings for the May 2005 quarter. The 
data are for full-time adult employees and are disaggregated by gender. 
  
Table 1:  Average Weekly Total Earnings, By Gender, Australian and Western 
Australia, May Quarter, 2005 








$- Difference in the 
Earnings of Males & 
Females 
WA $1,194.90 $867.80 72.6 27.4 -$327.10 
Australia $1,136.70 $920.30 81.0 19.0 -$216.40 
 
Difference 
between WA & 
Australia $58.20 -$52.50 - 8.3 - 
Source: ABS 6302. 
 
Table 1 suggests a significant gender pay gap. In the May 2005 quarter, women in 
Australia employed full time earned, on average, 19.0 per cent ($216.40) less than their 
male counterparts. The gender gap between men and women was even greater in WA. 
There, women received 27.4 per cent ($327.10 per week) less than their male 
counterparts. The Table further suggests that WA women have fared poorly, not only in 
relation to men in that State, but also in relation to other women in Australia. This is 
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illustrated in Figure 3.  It can be seen that at the May 2005 quarter there was a $52.50 
per week difference (or a gap of 5.7 per cent) in the average weekly total earnings of 
Australian and WA women employed full-time. We argue that these outcomes are 
partly the result of the enterprise bargaining system that operated in WA. 
 
Figure 3: Average Weekly Total Earnings of Men and Women in Western Australia 












































































Source: ABS 6302 
Note: data have been smoothed using a four quarter moving average. 
 
 
In February 1992, prior to the introduction of new legislation, women in WA engaged in 
full-time work earned 77.5 per cent of the total earnings of WA men and 98.7 per cent 
of the total earnings of all women nationally.  The WA gender pay gap was equal to 22.5 
per cent.  By May 1995 the WA gender pay gap had widened to 27.8 per cent, while the 
gap in the earnings of women in WA vis-a-vis women nationally had grown from 1.3 per 
cent to 5.7 per cent.  
 
Although women in WA did recover some ground between 1995 and 2002, Figure 3 
show that the gains were not maintained. Between May 2002 and May 2005 the gender 
pay gap in WA deteriorated by 4 percentage points.  At the same time, the gap in the 
earnings of women in WA and women nationally increased by 2.9 percentage points.  
Analysis elsewhere for the period 1991 to 1996 attributes the changes to institutional 
effects - that is, the changing arrangements for wage determination (Preston & Crockett, 
1999a and 1999b).  The changes are not accounted for by changes in the human capital 
or ‘productivity’ characteristics of participants, nor are they caused by any sudden shifts 
in occupational or labour market structures. 




Thus, we argue that changes in bargaining systems explain not only why WA women’s 
earnings have fallen compared to WA men, but also when compared to other women in 
Australia.  We suggest that an important part of the explanation is the system of 
individual/enterprise/workplace bargaining adopted in WA in 1993, a system unfettered 
by the need to apply the ‘no-disadvantage’ test, and having lower minimum conditions 
than those provided by the WAIRC and its federal equivalent. The federal system, in 
effect, provided for the ‘bargaining up’ of conditions. The WA system provided for such 
bargaining, but also provided for the driving down of conditions in competitive 
industries. This will be developed more fully below.   
 
There were two significant periods of decline in the relative earnings of WA women 
(Figure 3). One is associated with the introduction of the Workplace Agreements Act 
1993. The second, from the beginning of 2002, is associated with the movement from 
(WA) workplace agreements to Australian Workplace Agreements (AWA) in an 
attempt to avoid the legislative changes proposed by the new Labor Government at that 
time (Kobelke 2005). At the time of the election of the Gallop Labor Government 
(February 2001) there were an estimated 700 Western Australian (federal) AWAs. 
Within two years this number had increased to 4,000. By then, with only 10 per cent of 
the total Australian working population, WA accounted for over 30 per cent of all 
AWAs (OEA 2005). The Office of the Employment Advocate’s data suggest that most of 
the WA agreements were converted into AWAs in a short period, suggesting that the 
‘no disadvantage’ test was not applied in this conversion from State to federal 
agreements.  While it is understandable that such a test would have little relevance to 
the mining industry where agreed rates of pay exceeded the award rates, the test would 
have been relevant to the other three major industries in which workplace agreements 
had become common. 
 
WA workplace agreements were not universally adopted in that State. Indeed, by 
2001/02, just four industries accounted for over 60 per cent of all such agreements. 
One was mining (including services to mining) which accounted for 10 per cent of all 
agreements. The others were all female dominated industries – retail (21 per cent); 
accommodation cafes and restaurants (11 per cent); and business services (23 per cent) 
(Todd et al, 2005). In this context, workplace bargaining doubly disadvantaged women. 
The mining industry, a male-dominated industry with high wage levels, quickly moved to 
workplace agreements as a means of reducing the role of unions. Employees were 
coaxed into such agreements by even higher rates of pay. The opposite situation 
occurred in female-dominated low paid sectors, such as hairdressing, accommodation, 
cafes, restaurants and cleaning. These sectors have been, for the most part, removed 
from the protection of awards. The lack of bargaining power of employees has resulted 
in sectors marked by low pay, low skills, high labour turnover and employer attrition. 
  
A more detailed analysis of low paid sectors in WA sheds greater light on the erosive 
effects of individual workplace agreements on employment standards. In February 2002, 
the Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training (ACIRRT) 
produced a report for the Commissioner for Workplace Agreements. The study 
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examined four employment sectors:  contract cleaning, shops and warehousing, security 
officers, and restaurants tearooms and catering.  Fifty individual workplace agreements 
(IWA) for each of the four areas were randomly selected. In total, the 200 IWAs 
examined represented over 3,100 agreements in the sectors. These included groups not 
included in the data previously discussed and which has been concerned with full-time 
employees. The ACIRRT study found that such employees were the exception in the 
low paid sectors under review. Only 10.2 per cent of employees in the four sectors 
were employed on a full-time basis. Disturbingly, in view of heightened national security, 
only 4 per cent of security officers were employed on a full-time basis, most of whom 
(94 per cent) were male. By contrast, over 65 per cent of employees in the other three 
employment sectors were female. There were no junior security officers, but 33 per 
cent of those employed in the other three sectors were classified as juniors.7  The study 
further suggested that 62 per cent of those employed under IWAs were employed on a 
casual basis, and 26 per cent on a permanent part-time basis.   
 
The ACIRRT study compared conditions of employment under AWIs and their relevant 
awards. It found variance in the hourly rates of pay between the two instruments. 8 
These rates varied between $4.72 below the award and $5.60 above the award. Just 
over 56 per cent of IWAs provided for hourly rates of $1 or more below the relevant 
award rate. This resulted in one quarter of full-time employees, about the same 
proportion of permanent part-time employees, and over three quarters of casual 
employees, receiving an hourly rate of pay below the award. If other information is 
taken into account, the above understates the real situation since most IWAs (over 80 
per cent) absorbed into the hourly rates the penalty rates and loadings found in awards. 
In addition, a large number of IWAs did not provide for any wage increases during their 
currency, a period that could extend beyond five years.  
 
Most IWAs did not distinguish between ordinary time and overtime but simply 
increased the span of the working week. Thus, IWAs provided for ordinary hours to 
operate between Monday to Sunday, in effect removing Sunday penalty rates. The 
extension of daily ‘ordinary time’ hours further reduced the incidence of penalty rates. 
Most agreements provided for working time arrangements to be determined on the 
basis of management discretion. As a result, few agreements contained any overtime 
provisions, and when they did the vast majority specified overtime at the ordinary time 
rate. Few agreements (16 per cent) made provision for ‘time in lieu’ in cases where 
people were required to work ‘unsociable’ hours. When time in lieu was given, it was 
only at the ordinary equivalent, that is, time for time basis.  Weekend penalty rates 
were non-existent for catering workers and applied to only 16 per cent of security 
officers. Less than a quarter of shop assistants, and just over a half of cleaners, were paid 
weekend penalty rates. In addition, only 52 per cent of agreements provided for the 
                                                 
7 Under the Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993, juniors were defined to be those under the age 
of 21 (s. 13.(1)(b)). Under the relevant awards, they are defined as those under the age of 18. It is unclear 
whether or not the ACRRIT study took account of the different definitions. 
8 The Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 specified a 40-hour working week. Awards generally 
specified a 38-hour week. Again, it is unclear whether this distinction was taken into account in the 
ACRRIT study. 
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statutory four weeks annual leave. The other 48 per cent agreements absorbed annual 
leave into the ordinary rate of pay.  Not surprisingly, few agreements (less than 10 per 
cent) provided for annual leave loadings. For the most part, these loadings were simply 
absorbed into the hourly rate of pay.  
 
It will be seen that employment conditions in IWAs were inferior to those in awards, 
even when a direct comparison of hourly rates of pay might suggest otherwise. ACRRIT 
concluded that overall most IWA outcomes were detrimental to employees: 
 
The two key areas that differed when comparing the award entitlements to the 
IWA were hours of work arrangements and the hourly rate of pay. …  Workers 
were less likely to be paid any additional penalty rate for working overtime hours 
for weekend work. A common approach was to expand the ordinary working time 
arrangements and thereby reduce penalty costs that would have been previously 
been paid for working outside ordinary hours. Compensation for non–standard 
working times was generally reduced significantly, especially when compared to 
the conditions outlined in the relevant award, or was non-existent. While some 
workers on IWAs were receiving a significantly higher rate of pay relative to the 
award, this could largely be attributed to the fact that other entitlements … had 
been absorbed into the rate. A closer analysis found that the ‘loaded hourly rate’ 
for these workers did not appear to make up for the increasingly open and 
flexible hours of work arrangements. .. [T]he findings in this report suggest that 
workers [were] in general ‘worse off’ under individual workplace agreements.  




The new federal industrial relations system bodes ill for low paid workers. The limited 
amount of decentralization that has taken place in Australia since 1993 has resulted in a 
greater wage dispersion and the widening of the earnings gap. The tribunal system in 
which productivity gains were shared by all workers through national wage cases has 
given way to a more sectional approach. In this approach those with bargaining power 
and with skills that are in short demand, have done well relative to other workers.  
 
The WA experience confirms the federal experience. It also demonstrates that the 
absence of safeguards will have perverse effects on the lowly paid. The analysis suggests 
that even in the presence of safeguards, relative earnings of the lowly paid fall as better 
organized workers exploit market conditions. In the absence of safeguards, relative 
earnings will fall even further as the exploitation of market conditions by some is 
accompanied by the driving down of labour costs in areas of low paid employment. The 
new federal legislation reflects the WA situation. Indeed, in certain respects it goes 
further than the WA legislation in removing safeguards. Thus, it is less accommodating 
of unions and of collective bargaining than the WA legislation. The absence of the 
safeguards such as the safety net and the ‘no-disadvantage’ test will remove the previous 
‘suspender’ effect of awards. The reduction in unions’ ability to represent workers will 
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further reduce the flow-on of wage gains. The agreements stream will be identified with 
the trading off of conditions such as annual and sick leave, penalty and overtime rates, 
the extension of the weekly span of ‘ordinary’ working hours  and, in the case of low 
paid workers at least, a lack of adequate compensation for the loss of these conditions. 
The WA experience does little to encourage the belief that the driving down of the cost 
of labour will create greater employment. Rather, it would suggest the creation of a 
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Appendix 1: Adult Minimum Wages in the federal and Western Australian 
jurisdictions 
 




set by AIRC 
Minimum wage 
incorporated into 
state awards by 
WAIRC 
Rate 










1993 * * 275.50 (3/12/93) 46.1%   
1994 * * 301.10 (29/8/94) 48.8% May 1994 Nov 1994 
1995 * * 317.10 (29/9/95) 48.6% Jun 1995 Dec 1995 
1996 * * 332.00 (29/10/96) 48.4% Jul 1996 Jan 1997 
1997 359.40 (22/4/97) 359.40 (14/11/97) 335.00 (10/11/97) 47.6%   
1998 373.40 (29/4/98) 373.40 (12/6/98) 346.70 (7/12/98) 46.9% Sep 1998 Mar 1999 
1999 385.40 (29/4/99) 385.40 (1/8/99) 346.70 (no change) 45.7%   
2000 400.40 (1/5/00) 400.40 (1/8/00) 368.00 (1/3/00) 45.7% Dec 1999 Jun 2000 
2001 413.40 (2/5/01) 413.40 (1/8/01) 400.40 (22/3/01) 47.7% Dec 2000 Jun 2001 






1. Date of coming into effect in parentheses 
2. Asterisk denotes that no single minimum wage prevailed across low-wage industries.  
3. Adult means a person aged over 21.  
4. For non-casual employees, simply divide by 40 to obtain the hourly wage (the only exception is July 
2002 onwards, for which the divisor for the WA Statutory Minimum Wage is 38). Casual employees 
receive approximately 15-25% more, depending on the industry. 
5. Average wage is full time adult ordinary time earnings, from Australian Bureau of Statistics. “Average 
Weekly Earnings, 6302.0”, Table 13E (averaged over the year). 
6. Bold type denotes the six Western Australian statutory minimum wage rises analysed in this paper. 
 
Source: Leigh (2003) 
 
 
